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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court having jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0'). In an order dated December 2, 2002, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. SHOULD A DEVELOPER, WHO PURCHASED OVER 60% OF THE 
LOTS IN A SUBDIVISION KNOWING THE LOTS LACKED WATER 
RIGHTS AND WHO USED THAT LACK OF WATER TO NEGOTIATE 
NEARLY A 50% REDUCTION IN THE PURCHASE PRICE, BE 
RESPONSIBLE TO BRING THE REQUIRED WATER, OR SHOULD 
THAT BURDEN BE PLACED UPON INDIVIDUAL LOT OWNERS WHO 
PURCHASED THEIR PROPERTIES AFTER BEING TOLD BY THE 
DEVELOPERS THE SUBDIVISION HAD ADEQUATE WATER? 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether the lower court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party. Dwiggins v. 
Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). The factual submissions to the trial 
court are viewed in the light most favorable to finding a material issue of fact exists. 
Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos.. 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, no deference is accorded to the trial court's conclusions of law and 
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they are reviewed for correctness. Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 
1997). 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Wasatch County Ordinance 76-2 (emphasis added): 
All lots within a subdivision shall be served by an approved central water 
system. The subdivider shall submit proof that proposed water source is 
capable of providing at least sixteen hundred gallons per dwelling unit per 
day where water is to be used for lawn sprinkling, fire protection and other 
outside uses as well as inside uses, and at least eight hundred gallons per 
dwelling unit per day where water is to be used inside the dwelling only. 
Where domestic water is to be provided by municipality, water company, 
water districts or other domestic water agency the subdivider must submit a 
letter or other statement in writing from said agency indicating its ability 
and willingness to deliver the required amounts of water. Also, before 
granting approval of any subdivision satisfactory evidence must be 
furnished to the planning commission that said agency is capable of 
delivering the required amount of water without diminishing its own supply 
below the above stated standards. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Canyon Meadows subdivision in Provo Canyon was approved and platted by 
Wasatch County in the early 1980s. The original developers also created the Canyon 
Meadows Mutual Water Company to service the new subdivision. The master plan 
anticipated multiple phases of development with total potential build out at 160 lots. 
After recording two plats, with a total of 84 lots, the original developers learned that the 
vast majority of the water rights they claimed and intended to use in the subdivision had 
not been properly adjudicated and were declared invalid, leaving the rights to only 72 
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acre feet of uncontested water. This was insufficient to provide the required water to the 
subdivision lots. After selling approximately 30 lots to private individuals, the original 
developers encountered financial difficulties and filed bankruptcy without ever providing 
the additional water rights for the subdivision. 
Through a series of transactions in the bankruptcy proceedings, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acquired the unsold lots in the subdivision, plus 
surrounding acreage that had not yet been platted. Subsequent developers, who formed 
the New Canyon Meadows, L.C., and are collectively referred to as the "NCM 
developers," offered to buy the 51 remaining lots and the unplatted acreage from the 
FDIC for $900,000. However, after learning about the inadequate water problems and 
other issues with the subdivision, the NCM developers returned to the FDIC, and 
specifically citing the cost of securing additional water rights, demanded the price be 
reduced dramatically. The FDIC, who had already had another sale for 1.5 million 
dollars fall through due to these problems, agreed to reduce the price to only $500,000. 
After purchasing the property at a greatly reduced price, the new developers did 
not acquire additional water for the property, but instead marketed the lots as having full 
water rights. Under this marketing plan, all but 30 of the lots have been sold at full 
market prices as if the land had adequate water rights. Despite their previous knowledge 
of the inadequate water and the reduced price they paid, the NCM developers have 
refused to bring additional water for their lots, but instead insist that they are entitled to a 
pro rata share of the limited water that exists to service the subdivision. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW. 
The NCM developers filed suit against the water company alleging in its amended 
complaint breach of duty to provide water for domestic use, slander, tortious interference, 
trespass, and injurious falsehood. (Record on appeal (R.) at 337-343.) The NCM 
developers moved for a temporary restraining order, which was granted. (R. at 432, 438.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered the injunction to continue throughout 
the proceedings. (R. at 1335.) The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment. (R. at 1408, 1487.) The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
NCM developers holding that they were entitled to a pro rata share of the water in the 
water company, and enjoining the water company from 1) shutting off the water to the 
NCM developers' lots, 2) refusing to provide a pro rata share of water to the NCM 
developers' lots, and 3) publishing statements that NCM developers' lots are not entitled 
to water. The court denied the water company's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 
2267.) The remaining causes of action (slander, tortious interference, injurious falsehood, 
and trespass) were dismissed by stipulation of the parties. (R. at 2385.) 
III. STATEMENTS OF THE FACTS 
In the late 1970's and early 1980fs, a group of developers in Wasatch County began 
developing a subdivision in Provo Canyon. Wasatch County conditionally approved a 
master plan that contemplated a maximum of 160 lots being developed in multiple 
phases. Each successive phase or plat would be dependent upon the successful 
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completion of the preceding plat. The first two phases of the subdivision were approved 
and 84 lots were platted. (R. at 1482.) 
At the time of the development, Wasatch County, through Ordinance 76-2, 
required the developers to provide 1600 gallons of water to each lot every day (800 
gallons for culinary use and 800 gallons for outside use and fire protection). The 
ordinance states (R. at 1934): 
The subdivider shall submit proof that proposed water source is cable of 
proving at least sixteen hundred gallons per dwelling unit per day where 
water is to be used for lawn sprinkling, fire protection and other outside 
uses as well as inside uses, and at least eight hundred gallons per dwelling 
unit per day where water is to be used inside the dwelling only. 
This water requirement was expressly and specifically imposed on the original 
developers of the subdivision through a plat amendment (R. at 1938): 
Water will be supplied by Canyon Meadows Mutual Water Company in the 
amount of 800 gallons per day of treated water per dwelling unit for 
culinary use. An additional 800 gallons per day per dwelling unit will be 
supplied for irrigation purposes. 
Furthermore, although the county approved 84 lots, because of inadequate water 
the county prohibited the original developer from selling more than 70 lots. Specifically, 
the county attorney said: "It is our understanding you will sell no more than 70 units and 
will work diligently to resolve the question with regard to water for your project, known 
as Canyon Meadows." (R. at 90.) 
The original developers of the subdivision installed the infrastructure to treat and 
deliver water to the lots in plats A and B for culinary use only. (R. at 1481.) The original 
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developers then established the Canyon Meadows Mutual Water Company as required by 
Wasatch County to serve the lots and common facilities of the subdivision. Since its 
formation, the water company has only serviced the lots and common facilities in Plats A 
and B of the subdivision and the condo lots. 
The original developers represented to the county that the developers had more 
than sufficient water rights to provide water to 165 lots at 1600 gallons per day per lot. 
Id. However, after the subdivision was approved and the water company established, 
much to the consternation of the county and the original developers, the state engineer 
denied the developer's change application and declared that the vast majority of the 
proposed water rights in question were invalid. When the application to change the water 
use from agricultural to residential was submitted, it was brought to the state engineer's 
attention that the water rights had not been adjudicated in the Provo River decree of 1921. 
Based on this finding, the water rights were denied. Specifically, the state engineer found 
(R. at 2031): 
It is the opinion of the State Engineer that the use of the water asserted in 
[applicant's claim], on which the change application is based, could not 
have been overlooked in the litigation which resulted in the Provo River 
decree if it were a valid right. . . . The State Engineer believes that 
[applicant's claim] is invalid, and hence, the change application cannot be 
approved. 
Consequently, instead of holding the rights to over 295 acre feet of water, the 
water company was left with rights to only 72 acre feet, or a total (culinary and 
secondary) of 765 gallons per day per lot. (R. at 1481.) Under the water requirements in 
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effect in the subdivision, the water rights transferred and owned by the water company 
are only sufficient to provide water to about 40 lots in plats A and B. Id. 
Subsequently, the original developers encountered financial difficulties and 
declared bankruptcy, leaving the water company with only 72 acre feet of uncontested 
water rights. Some of the lots in the subdivision had been sold to private individuals. 
The remaining lots, and the surrounding unplatted areas which had not become part of the 
subdivision, went into foreclosure and ended up being owned by the FDIC. (R. at 1480.) 
Jay Johnson, a principal and agent of the NCM developers, negotiated the purchase 
of this property from the FDIC. (R. at 1960.) In contemplation of purchasing the 
property, the developers offered to purchase the property for $900,000. (R. at 1961.) The 
NCM developers performed due diligence inquiries on the property and during this period 
of investigation, became aware of several concerns with the property, including the severe 
lack of adequate water. (R. at 1960, 1876, 1880, and 1884.) 
Specifically, they found that there was only enough water for inside use with no 
water allocated for outside use. (R. at 1960 and 1876.) It was anticipated that either the 
number of lots that could be sold would have to be dramatically reduced or additional 
water would have to be purchased, which would be very expensive. (R. at 1959-60 and 
1876.) The NCM developers told the FDIC: 
Water availability for the development is limited. Earlier proposals by the 
previous developer received approval for 74 [sic] dwelling units but with 
water allocations only for domestic use (inside the house). No water was 
allocated for the irrigation of the landscaping. Landscaping represents 60% 
of the typical water allocations for a residence. Therefore to be able to 
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provide a normal water allocation which would allow landscape irrigation, 
the number of units would have to be reduced by 60 percent. The other 
alternative is to purchase additional property in the area that has a surplus of 
water shares. (R. at 1876). 
The NCM developers' bid for the Canyon Meadows property was reduced from 
$900,000 to $500,000 due to the inadequate water shares and anticipated percolation 
problems. (R. at 1959 and 1873.) In the purchase agreement, the FDIC expressly 
disclaimed any warranties as to water rights and sold the property "as is," specifically 
stating: "Seller hereby specifically disclaims any warranty, guaranty, or representation, 
oral or written, past, present or future, of, as to, or concerning (i) the nature and condition 
of the property, including, without limitation, the water, soil and geology . . . . (R. 1869.) 
Mr. Johnson understood the meaning of these disclaimers and informed his associates of 
the condition of the property. (R. at 1959.) The NCM developers received title to the 
Canyon Meadows property through a quit claim deed. (R. at 1959.) After acquiring this 
property at a bargain price, the NCM developers sold the lots at premium prices based on 
its express representations that there was more than sufficient water for the lots. (R. at 
2093.) 
Furthermore, the NCM developers took additional steps to propagate this 
misrepresentation to the trial court. In their original motion for summary judgment in 
1996, the NCM developers expressly stated they were in possession of the duly signed 
and endorsed stock certificates for the lots they owned: "At about the time of purchasing 
the lots from the FDIC, the FDIC delivered duly endorsed water stock certificates.... At 
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the time of purchasing the lots from the FDIC, the FDIC signed and delivered to me 
[Arden A. Engebretsen] the Water Share Certificates." (R. at 975.) However, years later 
after the water company was able to obtain the documents from the FDIC, it became clear 
that the FDIC never had any water shares to endorse or deliver (R. at 1873), Arden A. 
Engebretsen did not obtain original water certificates from the FDIC (R. at 1030-1029), 
and the new developer bought the property specifically without rights to water. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is undisputed that there is inadequate water to service all the platted lots in the 
subdivision. There is ample documentary evidence establishing that the original 
developer knew that there was an issue regarding water availability and that Wasatch 
County was aware of this fact and limited the number of lots the original developer could 
develop without obtaining more water. 
There is also ample documentary evidence that the NCM developers knew that 
there was inadequate water for the subdivision before they purchased it and negotiated a 
significantly lower purchase price for their property in large part because of the water 
issue. 
There is no evidence that indicates that the NCM developers are members of the 
water company. The NCM developers never received any stock certificates from the 
FDIC, the prior owner of the property. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel dictates that the NCM developers not be entitled 
to membership in the water company and a pro rata share of water. The NCM developers 
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were well aware of the limited water availability and used this fact to their benefit in 
negotiating a purchase price for the property. The NCM developers then sold their lots to 
individuals at full price with the representation that plenty of water existed. These lot 
owners are now members of the water company and will be injured if the Court allows 
the NCM developers to maintain their position that it is the water company's obligation to 
provide the additional water. The individual lot owners would be forced to pay for water 
for the developers' lots. 
The NCM developers purchased the land "as is" and without warranty as to any 
water rights and indeed with the knowledge that the land lacked water. When the original 
developer's water rights for the 3.4 cfs were declared invalid, any issued water shares 
corresponding to those rights, were an overissue and are thus void. 
The NCM developers come with unclean hands and it would be inequitable for the 
Court to grant them what they knew they were not entitled to at the time of purchase. 
This is especially true when they took the property at a greatly reduced price and sold it 
for full price. This windfall would only be enhanced if they are now allowed to pass the 
actual cost of buying the water on to the individual members of the water company. 
Further, the NCM developers attempted to directly mislead the water company and the 
trial court by asserting they had received duly endorsed stock certificates when in fact 
they did not. 
The water rights have not yet become appurtenant to the land owned by the NCM 
developers. A water right will not pass as an appurtenance to land conveyed by deed 
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until the state engineer issues a certificate of appropriation. An appropriation application 
must be approved, the water must be diverted and put to beneficial use, and the applicant 
must submit a proof of appropriation before the state engineer will issue the certificate. 
The water rights in question have not yet been able to submit the proof of appropriation 
and no certificate has been issued and the water cannot become appurtenant to the land 
without satisfying these procedural requirements. Regardless of the NCM developers' 
arguments, the water company bylaws cannot be used to make water appurtenant in 
contradiction to state law. 
Also, the question of the appurtenance of water rights involves questions of fact 
that require an analysis of the circumstances surrounding each particular case. 
Specifically, the courts must consider factors such as (1) the value of the land without the 
water rights, (2) how long water had been used on the land, (3) whether the land had been 
appraised on the assumption that water rights ran with the land, and (4) whether the 
purchaser obtained the land with the belief that the water rights ran with the land. 
Lastly, the intonations from the NCM developers is that they own water shares 
relating to lands outside the subdivision and that they may attempt to force the water 
company to provide water to their undeveloped lands at some time in the future. 
Rule 655-5 of the Utah Administrative Rules outlines how the Utah Division of 
Water Rights reviews service area determinations. The rule states that "the place of 
beneficial use is the water using entity's service area" and that the boundaries of "platted 
subdivisions would define the service areas for qualifying water companies." This rule is 
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a persuasive model for the Court to review in making a determination of service areas. 
The water company facilities have only serviced platted lots and common facilities within 
the subdivision. The infrastructure was designed and installed only to service the 
subdivision's lots. The treatment and storage facilities do not even have the capacity to 
fully service the lots already platted, let alone the acreage beyond the approved 
subdivision. These facts make it clear that the water company's service area is limited to 
the boundaries of the subdivision, i.e. plats A and B and the condo projects. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS INADEQUATE WATER TO SERVICE ALL THE PLATTED LOTS 
IN THE CANYON MEADOWS SUBDIVISION. 
A. Wasatch County Limited Lot Sales Because of Inadequate Water. 
It is undisputed that there is inadequate water to service all the platted lots in the 
subdivision. In an August 10, 1983, letter to the original developer, the county attorney 
indicated that there was uncertainty as to water rights, and whether the water rights were 
adequate in quantity, use, and point of diversion for the intended use. The county 
attorney asked the original developers to retain a licensed attorney to verify that sufficient 
water rights existed. (R. at 1111-12.) 
In a subsequent letter dated January 24, 1984, to the original developer, the county 
instructed the original developers to sell no more than 70 of the lots because there was 
inadequate water. In this letter the county enumerated several ways in which the original 
developer was working to supplement its water to provide for the entire subdivision. The 
items the original developers were attempting to accomplish were as follows: 
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(1) gaining county approval to adjust its water requirements from 1600 gallons per 
day per unit to 800 gallons per day per unit; 
(2) attempting to secure a supplemental water source from a spring on land the 
developers purchased; 
(3) providing irrigation water through a separate secondary irrigation system from 
its Little Deer Creek irrigation right; 
(4) getting written consent for the reconfiguration from all lot owners and their 
mortgagees who purchased under the original approval; 
(5) providing documentation to show the county that the developers had the rights 
to two claimed water rights and that they were appropriate to the intended use; and 
(6) working toward setting up a system that would allow other property owners in 
the area to use the water system for a fee and transferring their water rights to the 
developer' diversion point. (R. at 89-90.) 
However, the original developer never accomplished any of the items listed above. 
Indeed, with respect to the first option of adjusting from 1600 gallons per day down to 
800, it was only 15 days later that the developers had to confirm in a formal plat 
amendment that they would be bound to provide the 1600 gallons per day per lot to 
provide both culinary water and irrigation water as required by the county. (R. at 1932.) 
The 1600 gallon requirement was not a requirement unique to the Canyon 
Meadows subdivision. Indeed, Wasatch County had codified the requirement in 1976 as 
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part of its county-wide zoning and planning code. Specifically, Wasatch County 
Ordinance 76-2 states: 
All lots within a subdivision shall be served by an approved central 
water system. The subdivider shall submit proof that the proposed water 
source is capable of providing at least sixteen hundred gallons per dwelling 
unit per day where water is to be used for lawn sprinkling, fire protection 
and other outside uses as well as inside uses. 
Where domestic water is to be provided by municipality, water 
company, water districts or other domestic water agency the subdivider 
must submit a letter or other statement in writing from said agency 
indicating its ability and willingness to deliver the required amounts of 
water. Also, before granting approval of any subdivision satisfactory 
evidence must be furnished to the Planning Commission that said agency is 
capable of delivering the required amount of water without diminishing its 
own supply below the above stated standards. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 1934.) This ordinance was in effect at the time the subdivision was platted and 
approved, and plainly reads that the developers must submit proof that the central water 
system is capable of providing 1600 gallons per lot per day and that the developers are 
willing and able to deliver that required amount of water. 
At the trial court, the NCM developers argued that because Ordinance 76-2 used 
the term "water source" in establishing its water requirements, that it must be read to 
mean a source capacity or flow requirement, and not an actual water quantity 
requirement. Such a reading would require the Court to ignore the rest of the ordinance 
which clearly indicates the ordinance contemplates minimum quantity or "amounts." The 
position the NCM developers presented to the trial court cannot be adopted because it 
would render the ordinance incomplete and ineffective. 
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Throughout their arguments, the NCM developers point out, and the water 
company acknowledges, that the state currently requires two distinct and separate 
categories of water rights to be proven: peak daily demand (source capacity) and average 
yearly demand. If the NCM developers' argument is right and Ordinance 76-2 is only 
referring to peak daily demand, then the ordinance is absolutely silent to as to the average 
yearly demand. This would result in a subdivision being approved if it can show large 
flow rates, even if it has inadequate supplies to keep the flow running. 
For example, under the NCM developers' rationale, if a developer had a flow rate 
of 2.5 cfs, but only had a right to ten acre feet to meet the average annual demand, the 
developer would still be entitled to a subdivision of over a thousand lots because it could 
provide 1600 gallons of water per day to over 1,000 lots. This would be true even though 
the ten acre feet of water would be gone in less than three days, because under the NCM 
developers' interpretation, Ordinance 76-2 makes no requirement on average annual use. 
Under the NCM developers' theory, it would be okay for the subdivision to exist if it had 
enough water to fill a huge aqueduct, even if only for a minute or two. 
Obviously this was not the county's intent in trying to establish minimum water 
requirements. Instead, the county intended Ordinance 76-2 to establish both requirements 
as this is the only logical interpretation. In interpreting statutes, a basic principle of 
statutory construction is that the court should interpret the statute so as to give effect to 
legislators' intent and not to render a senseless or confusing result: "In considering the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of a statute, we will not interpret the language so that it 
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results in an application that is "unreasonably confused, inoperable, [or] in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" O'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 956 
P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (quoting Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 
590 (Utah 1991)). 
Adopting the NCM developers' interpretation would do just that. Setting one 
water requirement without addressing the other is meaningless. Just as the massive 
pumps installed at the Great Salt Lake in the floods of the 1980fs are nothing more than a 
conversation piece in today's drought when there is no water to put into them, so all the 
water in the Colorado River is worthless if you only have a straw to draw it out. Since 
Ordinance 76-2 does not separate out or differentiate between the requirements for peak 
daily demand and average annual demand, it must be intended to set the requirements for 
both, because without both the ordinance is meaningless. 
Additionally, Dee Hansen, who served as the state engineer and director of the 
Utah Division of Water Rights, stated in an affidavit that the amount of water the 
subdivision was required to have was 1600 gallons per day per lot, which would require 
roughly 150 acre feet of water, or more than double the current water that the water 
company has available. (R. at 1894-99.) 
In summary, the original developers gave the county written confirmation of its 
ability and willingness to provide 1600 gallons of water per lot per day for indoor and 
outdoor use. (R. at 1932.) That never occurred. Because the original developer never 
acquired more water, the county limited the developer in the number of lots it could sell. 
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B. The NCM Developers Admitted There was Inadequate Water. 
When the NCM developers were investigating purchasing the property from the 
FDIC, after the foreclosure from the original developer, the NCM developers discovered 
the problem with water amounts and water rights. In a letter to the FDIC, dated 
September 17, 1991, they acknowledged the water problem, stating: 
Water availability for the development is limited. Earlier proposals by the 
previous developer received approval for 74 [sic] dwelling units but with 
water allocations only for domestic use (inside the house). No water was 
allocated for irrigation of landscaping. Landscaping represents 60% of the 
typical water allocations for a residence. Therefore to be able to provide a 
normal water allocation which would allow landscape irrigation, the 
number of units would have to be reduced by 60%. The other alternative is 
to purchase additional property in the area which has a surplus of water 
shares. This complicates things very much and is not readily available. 
(R. at 1876.) In another letter to the FDIC dated January 13, 1992, in which the NCM 
developers were negotiating the purchase price for the property, they noted that: 
Water availability for the existing development is limited at best. Water 
availability for future development will have to be purchased from 
neighboring property owners at a very high cost. (R. at 1884.) 
The FDIC acknowledged the water problem "due to the lack of water shares" and 
significantly reduced the purchase price of the property. This is memorialized in an 
interoffice memo dated January 25, 1993, regarding the NCM developers' purchase of the 
property. In that memo the FDIC stated, "Historically, FDIC lost two sale escrows in 
1990, for $1,001,500 and $876,500, mainly due to percolation problems associated with 
the site. The referenced buyers original offer of $900,000 was reduced to $500,000 due 
to lack of water shares and anticipated percolation problems." (R. at 1873.) 
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It is clear from the above-referenced documents that the NCM developers 
exercised due diligence before purchasing the property and discovered that it had serious 
water availability problems. The NCM developers freely acknowledged the fact that the 
property lacked adequate water, and used that issue, among others, to receive at least a 
$400,000 reduction in the purchase price of the property from the FDIC. 
The NCM developers recognized that additional water was "not readily available" 
and would only come at "a very high cost." (R. at 1876, 1884.) Indeed, for this reason 
they obtained the property at a significantly reduced price. By filing this action, the NCM 
developers are seeking to develop all of their unplatted acreage and nullify the 70 lot limit 
all without spending any money for additional water. The developers want to pass the 
expense of bringing the additional required water on to the current lot owners who are the 
members of the water company and who have already paid a premium price for their lots 
with the understanding that adequate water existed. Many lot owners purchased their lots 
directly from the NCM developers. 
This is not the first time that the NCM developers have tried to nullify their 
obligations with respect to the property. In the recent case of Canyon Meadows 
Homeowners Association v. Wasatch County and New Canyon Meadows, L.C.. 2001 UT 
App 414, 40 P.3d 1148, the NCM developers refused to honor open space agreements 
with the home owners association, arguing that they were not bound by the agreements 
because the words "successors, lenders, and assigns" in the open space documents did not 
bind them as they had not directly entered into any agreement to be bound as such, and 
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that the obligation did not run with the land. The Court of Appeals rejected that 
argument and found: 
it would make little sense to agree to an open space agreement that was to 
last 'the life of said development' if, in fact, the rights created were merely 
personal and did not run with the land. . . . If all that was intended was a 
temporary set-aside of open space, then the County could have simply given 
the original developers a variance from their regulations and there would 
have been no need to convey an easement to the Association. 
Id. at [^18. Rejecting NCM's arguments, the appellate court set aside the summary 
judgment and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. Likewise here, the NCM 
developers are attempting to gain significant benefits and profit from developing and 
selling land while trying to avoid the costs of acquiring water, which they expressly knew 
would be necessary. The developers are trying to force that cost on to the individual lot 
owners in the water company. The NCM developers quickly point out that they would be 
bound to pay a share proportionate to the number of lots they own, but never point out 
that this reduces their out-of-pocket costs for the water by over 60%. Due to the cost of 
purchasing water, the NCM developers pled economic hardship to the FDIC and won a 
significant reduction in their purchase price. Now they hope to transfer the majority of 
that hardship on to the individual lot owners, many of whom purchased their lots directly 
from the NCM developers under the express representation that their lots came with more 
than sufficient water. This is inequitable and unjust, and cannot be allowed. 
When the NCM developers purchased the property, they purchased only what the 
original developer had to sell. Because of the state engineer's denial of the original 
developer's water claims in 1984, the original developer was clearly left with inadequate 
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water and the NCM developers purchased no more or less than what the original 
developer had. The original developer could not sell all 84 platted lots without bringing 
more water. The NCM developers should not now be free to sell all 84 lots without 
bringing additional water. The original developer could not develop its unplatted acreage 
without bringing additional water to the project, and likewise, the NCM developers 
should not be able to develop their additional acreage without bringing additional water to 
the project. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CURRENT 
DEVELOPER IS ENTITLED TO A PRO RATA SHARE OF WATER IN THE 
WATER COMPANY. 
A. The NCM Developers Are Not Members of the Water Company. 
For the NCM developers to receive a pro rata share of water in the water company, 
they must be members. However, there is no evidence on the record that indicates that 
the NCM developers are members of the water company, or that they purchased land 
from an entity that was a member of the water company. Initially, the NCM developers 
alleged that the FDIC duly signed, endorsed, and delivered to the NCM developers stock 
certificates issued by the water company, and that the NCM developers were entitled to 
water by virtue of possessing those duly endorsed certificates. (R. at 624.) However, 
when pressed to produce more evidence of endorsement and delivery than a photocopy of 
the front page, which does not contain any endorsement from the FDIC or any of their 
predecessors in interest, the NCM developers dropped this argument and focused their 
claim on the argument that it is ownership of land that entitles them to water. The NCM 
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developers did not receive any stock certificates from the FDIC and any claim that they 
did is false. 
Until the water company tried to remedy the confusion of who was a member and 
started issuing water stock certificates to those who could show some color of title, no 
water stock certificates were issued. The crux of the NCM developers' argument is that if 
stock certificates were not properly issued to legitimate members of the water company, 
then everyone who owns a lot in the subdivision should be a member, even those that 
bought their lots knowing there was a lack of water and whose purchase price reflected 
that deficiency. 
In oral arguments, the trial court expressed concerns over how to deal with the fact 
that the water company had provided water to some property owners who had built upon 
their lots without proof that they had certificates. The trial court erred in assuming facts 
not in evidence as there is nothing in the record to indicate which individual lot owners 
did or did not receive a certificate or who was receiving water and why. Who the 
members of the water company are, and whether stock certificates were issued, is a 
question of fact properly before a fact-finder, and that issue should not be determined on 
summary judgment. 
B. Equitable Estoppel Dictates That the Current Developers Not Receive a Pro 
rata Share of Water in the Water Company. 
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) a statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's 
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statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 
(Utah 1989). 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel dictates that the NCM developers not be entitled 
to membership in the water company and a pro rata share of water. There is an 
abundance of documentary evidence showing that the NCM developers were well aware 
of the limited water availability and used this fact to their benefit in negotiating a 
purchase price for the property. The NCM developers have been selling their lots to 
individuals for a premium price with the representation that plenty of water exists. (R. at 
2093.) 
Based on the current developers' specific representations, prospective buyers 
purchased lots believing that sufficient water existed. These lot owners are now members 
of the water company and will be injured if the Court allows the NCM developers to 
maintain their position that it is the water company's obligation to provide the additional 
water. If allowed, this position will result in lot owners being forced to purchase 
additional water, at a high price, to service the requirements of the development, even 
though they already paid a full price to the NCM developers for the lots the NCM 
developers bought at a discounted price because of inadequate water rights. 
The NCM developers, then, will experience a tremendous windfall at the expense 
of the individual lot owners. The NCM developers have unclean hands, and equity 
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dictates that they not be allowed to come before this Court and demand membership in 
the water company and a pro rata share of water at the expense of individual lot owners to 
whom they sold the lots. Thus, the trial court's holding that the current developer is a 
member of the water company and entitled to a pro rata share of water is in error and 
should be reversed. 
C. There Is No Contractual Basis for the NCM Developers to Receive a 
Pro-rata Share of Water in the Water Company. 
The water company's bylaws state that "all members must be owners or purchasers 
of real property in the service area," and that members shall be elected by the governing 
board, which requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the trustees. (R. at 1442-3.) 
Thus, there are two conditions for membership in the water company: (1) ownership of a 
lot in the service area and (2) an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the trustees. However, 
once an individual is a member of the water company, membership is not transferrable or 
assignable separate from the real property to which the water rights are "appurtenant." 
(R. at 1441.) 
Thus, one cannot argue that the mere purchase of a lot is sufficient consideration 
for membership in the water company, unless the immediate predecessor in interest was 
a member and the water rights became attached to the land. Not only do the bylaws 
provide a mechanism for voting lot owners into membership, it also provides a manner 
for terminating that membership for failure to pay dues. (R. at 2049.) Therefore, the 
mere purchase of land does not create membership if the predecessor in interest had not 
been voted in or if it had its membership terminated under the bylaws. In fact the new 
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developers did fail to pay dues and were expelled from the water company. That issue is 
being litigated in New Canyon Meadows, L.C., v. Canyon Meadows Mutual Water 
Company, et aL Fourth District Court, Wasatch County Department, Case No. 
010500466. 
The water company was created to provide water for the subdivision. When the 
master plan was conditionally approved, it envisioned the subdivision could expand to 
approximately 160 lots and that the water company would expand to service that many 
lots. When the original developer attempted to transfer the 3.4 cfs of water rights, the 
water company envisioned issuing 165 shares. The NCM developers have asserted that 
all of those shares were in fact issued and that they own most of them. (R. at 125.) 
However, when the 3.4 cfs water right was declared invalid after the subdivision was 
platted, the basis, and indeed the consideration, for the 165 shares was likewise destroyed. 
In essence, the check for water stock certificates bounced. Looking at the dates of the 
stock issuance and the date of the state engineer's ruling, this appears to be exactly the 
case. The stocks were signed on July 8, 1983 (R. at 1420-21), but the change application 
was not rejected until May 1984. (R. at 2031.) The water certificates were paid for with 
water the original developer did not own. 
If indeed the full 165 shares were issued to the original developer, it was in 
consideration for the water rights that were supposedly transferred. However, when the 
original developer failed to provide the water, the water company was relieved from the 
obligation of honoring the shares which were issued in excess of the water rights that 
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were actually transferred. It is well established that when "consideration fails because 
one party fails to perform, the other party's performance cannot be compelled." Coulter 
& Smith, LTD. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998). It is also well established that a 
purchaser receives only those rights the transferor possessed. The Uniform Commercial 
Code, as codified in section 70A-8-302, specifically states that a stock purchaser acquires 
the rights "that the transferor had or had power to transfer." 
Here, the original developer transferred the water rights it thought it owned to the 
water company in exchange for stock in the corporation. The most basic premise in 
establishing a water company is that individuals who own water rights trade them in for 
shares in the company so that the water can be distributed in a common system. 3 
Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights §§1480 and 1483 (2d Ed. 1912). The original 
developer's check bounced when the water rights were invalidated and therefore, the 
water company's obligation to provide the corresponding water, which the developer 
never had legal possession of, was extinguished. Thus, even if the NCM developers had 
received share certificates (which they did not) those shares should be declared void and 
surrendered to the water company for cancellation. 
D. The NCM Developers are not Bona Fide Purchasers. 
The trial court expressed concern about what should be done if no certificates were 
ever issued, and questioned why the NCM developers should be responsible for that fact. 
The answer lies in a notice and bona fide purchaser analysis. Under that analysis, the 
NCM developers' knowledge of a defect in the water rights precludes it from obtaining 
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any shares in the water company. It would be inequitable for the Court to grant to the 
NCM developers what the developers knew they were not entitled to at the time of 
purchase. Utah law is clear that only "one who takes without actual or constructive 
knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice" is a bona fide purchaser. Grahn v. 
Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1980). Knowledge is determined at the time 
of the actual purchase. Id. The Utah Supreme Court "in defining notice, has stated that 
'actual or constructive notice defeats a subsequent purchaser's interest. . . . '" Id (quoting 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank. 734 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah 1986)). 
In the instant case, the NCM developers had full knowledge of the defect in the 
water and they were on notice prior to the purchase of the property. Before the purchase, 
Jay Johnson, the NCM member, performed due diligence inquiries on the property which 
revealed the defects in the property. The NCM developers knew that the water company 
was left without sufficient water for the land they purchased, yet they still purchased the 
land at significantly less than its original market value. 
Allowing the NCM developers to obtain what they knew they were not entitled to 
at the time of purchase would, in effect, allow them to misappropriate property to which 
they are not entitled. "[W]hen a person has stolen, embezzled or misappropriated 
another's property, the injured party should be restored to the possession of his property 
or its equivalent so long as it has not passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser 
without notice." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 778 (quoting Church v. 
Bailey. 203 P.2d 547, 549 (Cal. App. 1949)). The NCM developers originally claimed 
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that they possessed original, duly endorsed water certificates issued them by the FDIC. 
They have no such documents. The NCM developers had notice of the defect and should 
not now be given the same benefits as a bona fide purchaser. 
E. The NCM Developers Cannot Claim they Should Have Been Issued Stock 
Certificates. 
It is clear that the original developer lost the vast majority of water rights it 
thought it owned, leaving insufficient water for subdivision. The question that remains in 
this lawsuit is whether those who succeed to the rights of the original developer, after the 
water rights fell through, may claim shares in the water company and to what degree. 
Under Utah law, an overissue of water shares exceeding the water company's water rights 
is void and unenforceable. 
This principle is demonstrated in East River Bottom Water Co v. Dunford, 109 
Utah 510 (1946). A stockholder told the water company he lost a certificate representing 
seven shares and so a replacement certificate was issued. Later, the stockholder returned 
and presented the certificate he claimed was lost and asked to have that certificate 
renewed. A new secretary, who was not aware of the earlier claim, issued a second 
certificate for the same seven shares. Next, a second party presented both certificates, 
requesting they be reissued as one certificate representing 14 shares. The water company 
issued a new certificate, in essence duplicating seven shares. Eventually, the water 
company discovered the error but by then the certificates had been transferred to a bank 
that had no knowledge of the previous events. The water company sought to have the 
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bank's certificates declared void. The bank responded it was protected as a bona fide 
purchaser. Despite the bank's arguments, the Utah Supreme Court held that "if 
certificates were issued that resulted in a duplication or overissue of stock, the duplicate 
issue is void, even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser and did not entitle the holder to 
receive a share in the waters distributed by the corporation." Id. at 518 (emphasis 
added.) The Supreme Court based this finding on the fact that the water company was 
created to distribute waters owned by the incorporators and had no power to issue 
additional stock that does not represent the water rights it owns. Id at 517. 
Likewise here, when the original developer's water rights for the 3.4 cfs were 
declared invalid, any issued water shares corresponding to those rights, resulted in an 
overissue and were thus void under East River Bottom. Even a bona fide purchaser 
would have no valid claim on such shares, much less someone purchasing the land 
knowing there was inadequate water. 
F. Water Rights Have Not Yet Become Appurtenant to the Land Owned by the 
NCM Developers. 
The water rights have not yet become appurtenant to the land owned by the NCM 
developers. U.C.A section 73-1-11(4) specifically states that "the right to the use of 
water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall be not be deemed appurtenant to 
the land." The water rights the current developer claims to have are by statute declared 
not to be appurtenant. This declaration is further sustained by the fact that the 72 acre 
feet water right owned by the water company is not yet fully appropriated. 
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In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court again affirmed the ruling that a water right will 
not pass as an appurtenance to land conveyed by deed until the state engineer issues a 
certificate of appropriation. Little v. Greene & Weed Investment. 839 P.2d 791 (Utah 
1992). Even when the state engineer had approved an application, but had not issued a 
certificate of appropriation, the court found that the water had not become appurtenant to 
the land. Loosle v. First Fed. Saving & Loan. 858 P.2d 999 (Utah 1993). In Swasev v. 
Rocky Point Ditch Co.. 617 P.2d 375 (Utah 1980), the plaintiffs brought an action to 
force the water company to issue stock with voting rights for "new" water that the 
company was in the process of appropriating. In that case, the water right had not yet 
been put to beneficial use and no certificate of appropriation had been issued by the state 
engineer. The appellate court accepted the water company's position that it would be 
"inequitable to issue stock with right to vote on permanent obligations, e.g. capital 
improvements, in respect to water rights which were presently terminable." Id. The 
appellate court found the plaintiffs' claim for the stocks to be without merit. 
An appropriation application must be approved, the water must be diverted and put 
to beneficial use, and the applicant must submit a proof of appropriation before the state 
engineer will issue the certificate. The water company has 72 acre feet approved, but it 
has not yet submitted the proof of appropriation and no certificate has been issued. The 
water rights are still in the process of becoming appurtenant; therefore they are still 
terminable and cannot become appurtenant to the land without satisfying these procedural 
requirements. 
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The water company's bylaws do contemplate that there will at some time be 
appurtenant water rights, but they also contemplate perpetual existence and that the 
process of making the water rights appurtenant would come in due course. The fact that 
the property has been in bankruptcy and foreclosure for years has made it so that the 
water rights have not yet become appurtenant to the land. The bylaws cannot claim water 
rights that are not being used. The bylaws have to be interpreted in light of state law and 
the statutory scheme. The bylaws cannot make the water rights appurtenant when state 
law does not yet allow it. The bylaws intend water rights to be appurtenant as soon as 
state law allows. Because the NCM developers' water rights are not yet appurtenant, the 
lower court's holding that it is a member of the water company and entitled to a pro rata 
share of water was in error. 
Before granting summary judgment, the trial court should have resolved several 
factual issues with regard to the NCM developers' claim to appurtenant water since the 
appurtenance of water rights "involves . . . questionfs] of fact and depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding each particular case." Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 72 P.2d 630, 
641 (Utah 1937) (citing 2 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights. §§1803, 1804). 
Utah courts, in deciding whether a water right evidenced by shares of stock in a 
corporation is in fact appurtenant to the land, have considered (1) the value of the land 
without the water rights, (2) how long water had been used on the land, (3) whether the 
land had been appraised on the assumption that water rights ran with the land, and (4) 
whether the purchaser obtained the land with the belief that the water rights ran with the 
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land. See, e.g.. Abbott v. Christensen. 660 P.2d 254, 256-257 (Utah 1983) (holding 
appurtenance where water was being used, contract demonstrated that both parties 
intended for water rights to run, and both assumed that water ran with land); Brimm v. 
Cache Valley Banking Co.. 269 P.2d 859, 864 (Utah 1954) (water right passed with land 
where land had little value without water, was appraised on assumption of water, and 
grantee paid for water believing that water ran with the land); Hatch v. Adams. 318 P.2d 
633, 634-635 (Utah 1957) (holding water not appurtenant where there was conflicting 
evidence on water usage and intent of the parties); Roundv v. Coombs. 668 P.2d 550, 
552-553 (Utah 1983) (holding water not appurtenant where deed clearly did not grant 
water rights even with limited use by grantee). 
When these four factors are applied to the current case, it becomes clear that the 
NCM developers should not be allowed to claim the water is appurtenant to the land. 
1) Price of the Land. The NCM developers paid only $500,000 for 51 lots and 
many acres of land surrounding the subdivision. This extremely low price reflects the 
property's lack of appurtenant water rights. Originally, the property was valued at a 
considerably higher price, evidenced by the early bids for $1,000,0000 and $876,000 
dollars for the property. (R. at 1873.) Even the NCM developers offered $900,000 for 
the property before they discovered the problems with percolation and the lack of water. 
Id. The most obvious example is evident in the difference between the price the NCM 
developers paid for the land when claiming it lacked water, and the price they charged 
individual lot owners asserting it had abundant water. After paying significantly less than 
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$10,000 a lot, considering the $500,000 also paid for the acreage surrounding the 
subdivision, the NCM developers sold the lots for many times that amount. 
2) How Long Water Had Been Used on the Land. The lots were in an approved 
subdivision, but water had never been applied to the land. Indeed as discussed above, the 
water had not been proved up and certified by the state engineer because the water had 
not yet been put to beneficial use. 
3) Whether the Land Had Been Appraised on the Assumption That Water Rights 
Ran with the Land. This factor is closely associated with the first. Clearly the value of 
the land with water was considered as is represented by the previous bids. However, all 
of these bids either fell through or were dramatically reduced, due in significant part to 
the lack of the required water. 
4) Whether the Purchaser Obtained the Land with the Belief That the Water Rights 
Ran with the Land. As has been repeatedly pointed out, the NCM developers knew there 
was inadequate water. 
Clearly, under these recognized factors, the NCM developers' argument that the 
water is appurtenant to the land fails and judgment should have been granted for the 
members of the water company. In the alternative, there are clear questions of material 
fact that need to be addressed and the NCM developers' motion for summary judgment 
should have been denied. 
G. The Water Company's Service Area Does Not Currently Extend Beyond 
the Canyon Meadows Subdivision. 
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There is no serious contention as to where the water company has historically 
provided water or where its current facilities can provide water. The only question is 
where will the water company be required to provide water in the future. The intonations 
from the NCM developers is that they own water shares relating to lands outside the 
subdivision and that they may attempt to force the water company to provide water to 
their undeveloped lands at some time in the future. 
The water company's bylaws state that the service area of the water company 
"includes but [is] not limited to Canyon Meadows Subdivision (all plats) and Glades 
Condominiums." (R. at 190.) If read as the NCM developers desire, the term "but not 
limited to" could be construed to extend the service area to any property, anywhere. 
Because the bylaws may be somewhat ambiguous as to how the service are should be 
defined now, it is reasonable to look to persuasive authority on what a proper service area 
should be. Rule 655-5 of the Utah Administrative Rules outlines how the Utah Division 
of Water Rights reviews service area determinations. The rule states that "the place of 
beneficial use is the water using entity's service area." The rule also states that the 
boundaries of "platted subdivisions would define the service areas for qualifying water 
companies." While not directly authoritative, the rule is a persuasive model for the Court 
to review in making a determination of service areas. 
It is appropriate to look at the historical service area to identify the water 
company's physical capabilities and to determine those areas which have benefitted by 
the water company's services in the past. For nearly 20 years, the water company has 
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only serviced platted lots and common facilities within the subdivision. The 
infrastructure was designed and installed only to service the subdivision's lots. The 
treatment and storage facilities do not even have the capacity to fully service the lots 
already platted, let alone the acreage beyond the approved subdivision. These facts make 
it clear that the water company's service area is limited to the boundaries of the 
subdivision, i.e. plats A and B and the condo projects, and the Court should rule that the 
water company should not be required to extend the service area any further. However, if 
there are factual issues in dispute, then the Court should remand this issue for a 
determination by a fact-finder. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold, based on the admission 
of the parties and documentary evidence, that there is insufficient water to service all of 
the platted lots in the Canyon Meadows subdivision, or, in the alternative, to hold that a 
question of fact exists requiring a remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits of the 
issue of adequacy of water for the subdivision. 
2. If the Court of Appeals finds that there is insufficient water to service the 
Canyon Meadows subdivision, the water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold that 
the current developer is responsible to bring any additional water required by the county, 
or, in the alternative, to find that a question of fact exists as to who is responsible to 
provide the additional required water, and remand to the trial court for a determination. 
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3. The water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold that a question of fact 
exists as to whether the developer is a member of the water company and remand to the 
trial court for a determination at trial. 
4. The water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold that a question of fact 
exists as to whether equitable estoppel prevents the current developer from claiming a pro 
rata share of water in the water company. 
5. The water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold as a matter of law that 
water rights have not yet become appurtenant to the land owned by the current developer. 
6. The water company asks the Court of Appeals to hold that a question of fact 
exists as to whether the water company's service area extends beyond the Canyon 
Meadows subdivision. 
DATED this j% day of April 2003. 
DUVAL HAWS & FREI, P.C. 
GORDON DUVAL 
BRIAN K. HAWS 
JARED FREI 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
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ORDINANCE NO. 76-2 
AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR THE REGULATION OF WASTE 
DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, WATER SUPPLY AND STORAGE IN WASATCH COUNTY. 
WHEREAS, regulations for waste disposal systems and water 
supply and storage systems for Wasatch County have in times past 
been contained in the Wasatch County Zoning Ordinance and Sub-
division Ordinances and, 
WHEREAS, it is deemed wisdom by the County Commission that 
they not be included as a portion of the new Wasatch County Develop-
ment Code9 and, 
WHEREAS, the Wasatch County Board of Health has seen fit 
to recommend the following regulations to the Wasatch County Board 
of County Commissioners. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
COUNTY OF WASATCH, UTAH, ORDAINS AS FOLLOWS: 
Section I 
All septic tank drainfields in Wasatch County shall have an 
absorption rate of no faster than one (1) inch in four (4) minutes 
and no slower than one (1) inch in sixty (60) minutes for an absorp-
tion field. All tests shall be run and adjudged in accordance with 
regulations of the Utah State Health Department. 
Section II 
No seDtic tank shall be approved in Wasatch County on 
slopes of qreater than twenty-five (25) per cent. 
Section III 
No septic tanks shall be approved where there is not 
adequate soil of at least forty-eight (48) inches below the drain 
field in any season of the year. 
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Section IV 
No holding tanks shall be approved in Wasatch County. 
Section V 
All water provided by wells shall meet standards set by 
the office of the State Engineer and State Board of Health. The 
developer shall provide water storage facilities which shall contain 
at least one-half (1/2) the daily supply requirements under Section 
VI of the ordinance all in accordance with the State Board of Health 
and, Board of Fire Underwriters Standards. 
Section VI 
All lots within a subdivision shall be served by an approved 
central water system. The subdivider shall submit proof that proposed 
water source is capable of providing at least sixteen hundred gallons 
per dwelling unit per day where water is to be used for lawn sprinkling, 
fire protection and other outside uses as well as inside uses, and at 
least eight hundred gallons per dwelling unit per day where water is to 
be used inside the dwellinq only. 
Where domestic water is to be provided by municipality, water 
company, water districts or other domestic water agency the subdivider 
must submit a letter or other statement in writing from said agency 
indicating its ability and willingness to deliver the required amounts 
of water. Also, before granting approval of any subdivision satisfactory 
evidence must be furnished to the Planning Commission that said agency 
is capable of delivering the required amount of water without 
diminishing its own supply below the above stated standards. 
Section VII 
No l o t w i th in a large scale development shal l be located 
more than one thousand (1,000) feet from a f i r e hydrant, which hydrant 
shall be connected to a pipe and water system that w i l l del iver a con-
tinuous flow of water of at least f i ve hundred (500) gallons per minute 
over a two nour period of tirr.c. 
PASSED by the Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch, Utah, 
t h i s T f / ^ day of September, 1976. 
H^peU H? /Smith 
t / - / ) Lxiieland w. Tver 
A n 1 n M r\ 
WASATCH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Z5 North Main • Hibtr City. Utah M032 • Pho** (SOI) {£4-3211 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
GEORGE HOLMES. CHAIRMAN PETE A. COLEMAN REGINALD C. TAOO 
January 24, 1984 
John R. Hansen Jr., President 
S2HM Corporation 
% Hansen & Erickson 
Idaho First Plaza, Suite 1502 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Boiae, Idaho 83702 
Dear John: 
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation of January 
24, 1934, wherein, you requested that you be able to sell up to 
70 lots of the 83 that you now have approved using the treated 
water which extends from your change application No. A-11136, 
dated March 12, 1931 
It is our understanding you will sell no more than 70 units 
will work diligently to resolve the question with regard 
water for your project, known as Canyon Meadows. 
My understanding of what you would be working on is as 
follows; 
1 You wish to provide culinary water only from the 
treated water system and refigure your rights at 800 
gallons a day per unit instead of the current 1600 * w. 
gallons per day. Tli'n *^*> n<s>+ /?/V<="^</ j *** , ,!l*l^ 
You intend to supplement vour present approval for 70 
units with water from a spring which you purchased vi 
the property from the Hoovers. 
th /**+ > 
4. 
You will provide ijirlgaiiaji.water through a secondary/ TU>*>*/'.* 
irrigation system from your little Deer Creek I ^j* **"* 
irrigation rignt. 
You will provide us with evidence of the written 
consent of all owners and their raortagees who purchased 
lots under the original approval• 
mjC y» O- t **>* 
W 
| O V 
JU«fe.# •» m* P+4C9 
s? n n n n ft f> 
5# You will provide us with *nnn^ r><o4- J 
show that you have the piRhttSih! docum;ntation to 
mentioned and that they are aLrn . f 0 ^ t w o 8 0 u r c e s 
intend to make. ^ / ™ 2 J 7 V ! ; ^ ^ ^ you 
6. Ve understand you are working -H^ WO*,**, 
uni t , and would like to allow other. iTll?"?™1 S&0 
your water .ystea for a fee anftranafar o1 ? h T t 0 U 8 e 
appropiate water r ight , to your di?e?. lon point. 
S ?h"oughr/araoo0nUSast0poPea?oU.0n ""* B a t t " a n d « » " « - to 
Sincerely, 
RAM/ra 
cc: Robert Grow 
Wasatch County Commission 
Robert A. Mathis, AICP 
wasatch County Planner 
1 000086 
AMENDMENT TO CANYON MEADOWS APPLICATION 
FOR PLATS B AND THE GLADES 
Water Supply. 
Water will be supplied by Canyon Meadows Mutual Water Company 
in the amount of 800 gallons per day of treated water per dwelling 
unit for culinary use. An additional 800 gallons per day per 
dwelling unit will be supplied for irriqation purposes. The 
irrigation water will be supplied initially through the culinary 
line and will therefore be treated. Sometime before more than 84 
units shall have been built in the development a separate raw 
water Une will be constructed to supply the irrigation water to 
the rear of the lots with the exception of a small number of lots 
too high up to be accommodated for sprinkler irrigation by the 
pressure available in the raw water line. 
DATED: % 7^L£ , _, 1984. 
SI 
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BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE DF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLI- ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CATION NUMBER 55-6826 (a-12635) ) 
Change Application Number 55-6826 (a-12635) was filed by East 
Heber Valley Water Company to change the" point of'"diversion, and 
place and nature of use of 0.5 cfs. of water evidenced by 55-1411 
(Diligence Claim No. 862). Heretofore, the^water was.diverted 
from Provo Deer Creek (AKA Little Deer Creek) at a point located 
North 212 feet and West 212 feet from*the SE Corner of Section 
36, T4S, R3E, SLB&M. The water was used for'the irrigation of 
15.5 acres of land from April 15 to'October 15-
Hereafter, it is proposed to divert the^ 'O .5'cf sV~6f water from 
Provo Deer Creek at a point located^North 600 feeVand West 300 
feet from the SE Corner of Section 36; *T4S, R3E*, ^ SLB&M. . „ It is 
intended to use the water year-round for the^domestic require-
ments of 98 families, stockwatering of"50 horses#-and uses within 
a 100 unit motel and a restaurant. 
The change application was advertised in the Wasatch Wave from 
April 21, 1983 to May 5, 1983 and wasJprotested byrthe Provo 
River Water Users1 Association, the^United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District. 
A hearing was held on November 17, 1983 at* Heber City,'Utah. The 
applicant's representatives stated tKatT the proposed ^change would 
result in a development as described-in "the**application with most 
lots varying in size from 0.25 to 1.0#acres with" a septic waste 
system being used. The water is to^be;"conveyed by^mearis of av 
pipeline from Provo Deer Creek to the place of use. The appli-
cant's representatives also stated that-to their knowledge, the 
diligence claim filed in 1960 is a va'lid claim in that the 
ditches used have been well maintained and appear to have been 
used for a long time. 
The protestants raised several questions ; first of 'which was 
whether the diligence claim that this change 'application is based 
upon can be considered a valid claimY\The protestants ' stated 
that since the applicant's predecessors'"were party to the Provo 
River Decree, the applicant and all^successors- are precluded from 
filing on any water which is tributary*vto -the Provo River. The 
protestants also questioned if part'6f/the" filed diligence claim 
was for land which the applicant did^riot own /*J namely ^ the Weeks 
Bench. Finally, the protestant expressed" concern* asHo the quan-
tity of water changed being insufficient for the uses" stated suchf §? 
as the possibility that the families*will riot~be stopped'from £ £} 
irrigating their lawns with the wate^ f r'om'this change 
application. 
m-r t o n \ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CHANGE APPLICATION 
NUMBER 55-6826 (a-12635) 
Page - 2 -
The State Engineer has reviewed the Provo River Decree and other 
records pertaining to water 'rights of the area, and has concluded 
the following: 
a. 55-1411 (Diligence Claim No. 862) asserts a right to 
divert 3.4 cfs. for the irrigation of 120 acres. 
\ 
b. The Provo River Decree/ Civil^No/ 28 8 8/Hda'ted, May 2, 
1921, decreed the waters tof JPJcbVo^Deer'<Cree\C''as follows* 
1. Paragraph 27(a)r-0?50 cfsi_.f6f/the'lrigation 
of 30 acres. 
2. Paragraph 45(a)—1;27 cfs.- for the-"irrigation 
of 76.89 acres* 
3. Paragraph 45(b)—0.66 cfs/*for the irrigation 
of 39.18 acres* 
4. Paragraph 104 — 2*.0,dfs* forHhe irrigation of 
120 acres. 
c. Present ownerships of the above-mentioned decreed rights 
have been determined, and the applicant holds no title 
to any/part of them. 
d. It is stated on 55-1411 (Diligence Claim No. 862) that 
the appropriation was made in^l900 by John W. Hoover and 
John H. McEwan. 
e. John W. Hoover and John H. McEwan were both parties to 
the Provo River Decree* 
In view of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the ^ State^Engineer 
that the use of "water asserted in 55-1411 . (Diligen'cV'Claim No. 
862), on which the change application is^basedf fcolild "not ^ have 
been overlooked in the litigation which * resulted >inx the>Provo 
River Decree if it were a valid rightv ^The*State'Engineer-4 
acknowledges that the use of water may"have*taken^placV subse-
quent to the Decree instituted on -some' 'othe^vJate^ 
Decree without the filing of a change"Vppric^tionn"*with "tKe State 
Engineer to change point of diversion and .-place 'Jof -\i&e?: Never-
theless, the State Engineer believes that^55-1411 "(Diligence 
Claim No. 862) is invalid, and hence, the'change application can-
not be approved. 
It is, therefore, ordered and Change Application Number 55-6826 
(a-12635) is hereby REJECTED. 




NUMBER 55-6826 (a-12635) 
Page - 3 -
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, vrhich provides for plenary review by 
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate District 
Court within sixty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this 25th day of May, 1984. 
^ — • ^ 
Dee C. Hansen,.P; E<,~State Engineer 
DCH:EDF:slm 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 25th day 
of Mayf 1984, to: 
East Heber Valley Water Company 
1140 Aspen Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Central Utah Water Cons. Dist. 
c/o Edward W. Clyde, Attorney 
77 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
P.O. Box 1338 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Provo River Water User's Ass. 
c/o Joseph Novak 
P.O. Box 3000 







M Jay Johnson A.l.A. & Associates Inc. 
1125 Foothill Blvd./La Canada Flintridge Ca. 91011 
September 17, 1991 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
P.O. Box 7549 
Newport Beach, Ca. 92658-7549 ,____ 
M M , DanMasucci ^ , 7 ^ K<«»*>W0I2-
KE: canyon Meadows Provo Canyon / « ^ ^ K ^ [ / O ^ 
- --- "--v. o^o- File Name LAA/yghn IJm/CQ\ Provo, Utah 84604 Bank No. 7516 
Lamis No. 003276601 Account Officer Coci 
ID Name 
Dear Mr. Masucci, 
For the past few weeks Dean Hernstreet ^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ f ^ 
in the Canyon Meadows propertyin Provo, Utah. We have met witn 
some of the Wasatch County ofiicials to ^ ^ . " ^ / ^ u S S 
to development of the property. We reel we ar« x"
 n n f p n H a l 
about theexisting problems (which are several) and potential 
complications of developing the property to make the following 
offer at this time. 
1 ThP nroDertv to be sold and purchased consists of 
U
 approximaSy^SO acres of land known by the name "Canyon 
Meadows" Provo, Utah except for that Portions of the 
property previously conveyed and ? r ^ n t ^ f C J e r v i ° e s 
?he purchase includes all water rights, water services, 
water shares and improvements on the property. 
2. The purchase shall be $450,000 cash. 
3. There shall be a 90 day escrow. 
„* fhic nffpr the buyer shall deposit into 
4. Upon acceptance of this otrer tne « ^ c 
escrow $10,000. 
5. Seller shall promptly deliver within 15 days or less to the 
buyer for examination such abstracts of title, title po 
-an|-other--evidences of title the seller may obtain. 
^ ii v „ oi ri=,vc= after receipt of a preliminary title 
6. Buyer shall have 21/ays after rec P
 t i t l e i d e d 
report to review and approve tne eviu 
by seller. 
QX3«AN P 7 ^ V 
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7. If an examination of the title should reveal defects in the 
title, the buyer shall notify seller in writting thereof. 
Seller agrees to take all reasonable action to clear the 
title. The escrow shall be extended one day for each day 
after the seller is notified of the defect in the title 
until such defect is cleared. If the seller does not clear 
the title within 60 days time the buyer may do so at 
sellers expense or the buyer may request escrow be canceled 
and his full deposit returned. 
8. After approval of the title report the seller shall deposit an 
additional $90,000 into escrow. The total deposit of $100,000 
shall be released to seller and credited to the purchase 
price. 
9. There are no other contingencies of purchase except delivery 
of clear title. The seller shall provide a policy of title 
insurance and make final conveyance by Warrenty Deed. 
Investigation of the property revealed several major areas of 
concern. There are areas of serious geological slippage on 
portions of the property. This may be cured but it will be 
expensive. It will be necessary to complete additional geological 
investigations before sub-divided parcels can be sold. Portions 
of the property will have to remain undisturbed and set aside as 
open space. 
Water availability for the development is limited. Earlier 
proposals by the previous developer received approval for 74 
dwelling units but with water allocations only for domestic use 
(inside the house) . No water was allocated for irrigation of 
landscaping. Landscaping represents 60% of the typical water 
allocations for a residence. Therefore to be able to provide a 
normal water allocation which would allow landscape irrigation, 
the number of units would have to be reduced by 60%. The other 
alternative is to purchase additional property in the area which 
has a surplus of water shares. This complicates things very much 
and is not readily available. 
The third problem the project has which is one of the reasons it 
failed in the first place is that the property has no frontage 
to speak of on highway 189 and poor access. The development cannot 
be viewed by passing motorist which makes marketing more 
difficult. There is a 7 acre property between Canyon Meadows and 
highway 18 9 with several vintage buildings on it. The approach the 
Canyon Meadows is along side of one of the old homes, is on a 
narrow road and very understated to say the least. (See photo 
enclosed). To insure a proper entrance to the development and to 
gain the frontage on highway 189 needed the purchase of the 7 acre 
"Carter" property is imperative. This could possibly also help on 
the water problem issue mentioned before. 
4102212 
The other big question is sewage disposal. The soil on the 
property has a large content of clay which does not work 
well for private systems. Relying on private septic systems will 
limit the number of potential dwelling units to a small number. 
The County says an on site sewage treatment plant is necessary if 
a significant number of units is to be built. We are investigating 
weather or not that is feasible to consider. 
I have mentioned these points to demonstrate that we are serious 
in our ''interest but aware of these defects as would any potential 
jjuyex wiiu ti^u±d LQ(.C uaci cxiuc: cu invesLiycicc uic oiuuQLiun L.xiere. 
Neverthelcrc T,9 ^sz1 ^^^ v^-z-^ o^ r^ ^^^ or-oa hav^ rmfpnti^i 5tnd 
warrent the investment required to complete the initiated 
development concept. We are prepared now to work with you on 
reaching an agreement for the purchase of the property. We look 




1244 GREEN LANE 
LA CANADA FLINTRIDGE, CA 91011 
(818) 790-0034 FAX (818) 790-9319 
Via Facs imi l e (714) 263-7699 
Fede ra l Deposi t Insurance Corp. 
c /o Mr. Daniel Masucci 
P. 0 . Box 7549 
Newport Beach, Ca 92658-7549 
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Account OfT/cer Cods 
Re: Canyon Meadows, Provo Canyon/ I^ (6q(V^ § 
Provo, Utah 8 4 604 
Bank No. 7516 
Lamis No. 003276601 
Dear Mr. Masucci, 
We want to take this opportunity to thank you for your time 
and effort in assisting us in obtaining as much information as 
possible on the above referenced property. Attached you will 
find an offer which we have prepared and which takes into account 
the numerous existing and future problems of this project. 
We have been conducting our investigation for several months 
and have discovered the following facts. 
1. Septic System: The development was originally approved 
based on preliminary septic investigations for each lot that now 
appear may have not have been thorough enough. So far six homes 
have been built. Three had difficulty getting septic approval. 
Lot 19-A failed and is now considered unbuildable. We are 
concerned that other lots in the development may have the same 
problems. The County Health Department will not approve 
additional development of the property unless an onsite sewage 
treatment facility is constructed. The feasibility of this is in 
question however. 
2. Geology: The property is in a known slide area. There 
is evidence of slippage on the property and the County Planner 
Bob Mathis feels the site needs extensive hydrological and 
geological study before additional development can be considered. 
£• 
- i -
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3. Flood Drainage Program: In a letter dated March 16, 
1983, from Robert A. Mathis, Wasatch County Planner, one of the 
conditions for approval of the project was an acceptable flood 
drainage program. Without the flood control structure, there is 
no such program, therefore, he is suggesting that no future 
permits be issued in the area, 
4. Road Widening: The Utah Department of Transportation is 
in the process of widening Provo Canyon Road. A portion of the 
subject property will be taken for the road widening and as of 
this date we have been unable to determine the exact location and 
potential' impact. 
5. Reserved Property Rights: Until we receive a current 
preliminary title report we cannot determine the nature of the 
property rights which have been reserved for the future 
development, compared to those which need specific approval from 
the Homeowner's Association. There could be potential ownership 
problems with regard to open space, common area and the 
Homeowner's Association. 
6. Warm Springs: There are warm water springs affecting 
Lot #41 and #28 and probably more. Because of the springs, there 
is considerable amounts of surface water near these lots which 
adversely affects their building potential and value. 
7. Financing: Is just about impossible to obtain. Over 
the course of the past two to three months we have talked to and 
met with twelve lenders who we were told could help us with some 
short term financing. None have been willing to consider a loan 
of any amount on the property. They cite several factors for 
this. a) Past history is that this project failed. They don't 
believe that it was only caused by economic bad times and they 
don't want to take any chances. b) The economy is good in 
Utah. There are plenty of good projects to finance in 
established areas so they are not doing projects in marginal 
areas such as recreational development. c) Land development has 
historically had a bad history of failure in Utah and most banks 
will not even look at a package. d) Most of the large banks are 
located in Salt Lake City and don't do much business in the 
Provo/Orem area. They referred us to the local banks in the area 
but none of them have any interest in lending on the purchase. 
e) Not being connected to the city water is a concern. f) Not 
having convenient access to schools, churches and shopping is a 
concern. g) Difficult access to the project during winter 
months (Provo Canyon is sometimes closed during heavy snow fall) 
makes the development a hard sell as a potential year round 
living community. Without the ability to obtain financing the 
project is not as attractive to us since it will require much 
more of our own capital to be invested than we were planning on. 
In today's economy the more cash a project requires the less 
value it has. 
-2-
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8. Reputation. Canyon Meadows has a bad name and image. 
In our recent trip to Utahf we visited with real estate 
professionals who would like to work with us and we talked to 
several financial institutions who were familiar with the 
development. We got the same reaction from everyone we talked to 
that "the development has problems". The problem with the septic 
approvals was a known fact and the poor entrance was also 
mentioned. Dee Olsen, the Homeowner's Association president, 
confirmed that indeed these were serious problems that need to be 
resolved. The fact that it has been in foreclosure for ten years 
and has not been successfully developed has tarnished its image 
with the1real estate and financial communities and is a concern 
to prospective lot buyers. 
9. Prior Agreements: There are some unresolved 
questions concerning prior agreements made between the previous 
developers and adjacent property owners. These agreements may 
cloud the title and/or make future financing of the individual 
lots impossible. 
10. Water Availability: Water availability for the 
existing development is limited at best. Water availability for 
future development will have to be purchased from neighboring 
property owners at a very high cost. 
As you can see, we have conducted our preliminary 
investigation and have discovered numerous problems associated 
with the purchase of this property. This investigation has 
consumed a lot of time and money without us having the exclusive 
right to purchase the property. Therefore we are submitting the 
enclosed Offer to Purchase. We feel that prior to committing 
ourselves and additional monies to find a solution to the above 
mentioned problems, we need to know that we have the exclusive 
right to purchase the property. 
We thank you in advance for your help and cooperation. We 
are available at any time to discuss the terms and conditions of 
this Offer to Purchase. 
We await your reply. 
Sincerely, / / Sincerely, 
u f¥yOp 




4 1 n n o n A 
Jay Johnson A.I.A. & Associates Inc. 
1125 Foothill Blvd/La Canada Flintridge Ca. 91011 
January 19, 1993 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
c/o Mr. Daniel Masucci 
P.O. Box 7549 
Newport Beach , CA 9 2 6 5 8 - 7 5 4 9 
Re: Canyon Meadows Development 
Lamis No: 003276601 
Your F i l e : Highway 189 Provo Canyon 
Wasatch County , Utah 
Dear Mr . M a s u c c i , 
We have e x e c u t e d t h e new p u r c h a s e a g r e e m e n t b u t have r e s p o n d e d 
w i t h an "Amendment to the Purchase AgrffqRjent". Most n o t e a b l f v,* 
have r e d u c e d t h e o r i g i n a l p u r c h a s e j i M c e a g r e e d upon f r o m 
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 b a s e d upon a d \ / q r £ e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e 
p r o p e r t y t h a t were d i s c o v e r e d d u r i n g the Mt>ue D i l i g e n c e P e r i o d " . 
The s e v e r i t y of these c o n d i t i o n s were not p r e v i o u s l y known to the 
s e l l e r or t h e b u y e r a t t h e t i m $ Df e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e 
o r i g i n a l p u r c h a s e a g r e e m e n t . 
I n the " S i t e D e s c r i p t i o n and A n a l y s i s " n a r r a t i v e f o r Canyon Meadows 
o r i g i n a l l y s e n t t o us by y o u , t h e a p p r a i s e r makes m e n t i o n or d 
p e r c o l a t i o n p r o b l e m , bu t does n o t r e a l i s e t h e e x t e n t of i t s 
s e v e r i t y . His on ly reason g i v e n f o r thfl f a i l u r e of the develop ., 
was "due t o t h e g e n e r a l s l o w down i n t b p economy d u r i n g t h e 
e a r l y 1980*5" . At the t i m e we e n t e r e d i n t o the purchase a g r e e ^ e ^ 
t h e p e r c o l a t i o n i s s u e d i d n o t a p p e a r t o be a b i g p r o b l e m t o 
us e i t h e r . To the c o n t r a r y we now b e l i e v e the s e v e r i t y of tne 
p e r c o l a t i o n p r o b l e m and a n o t h e r seroufr p r o b l e m , t h e s t i n c h of 
s u l f u r e m i t t i n g f r o m s u l f e r s p r i n g s on t h e p r o p e r t y , a l s o 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e of Canyon MeacicfH? end d i r e c t l y e f f e c t s 
i t s p r e s e n t v a l u e . 
On J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1 9 9 3 I and M r . John M a h l i s u b m i t t e d t o you a copy 
o f t h e p e r c o l a t i o n t e s t r e s u l t s f o r 17 o f t h e l o t s t o ^w 
p u r c h a s e d a t C a n y o n M e a d o w s . T h i s r e p o r t f r o m RB&G 
E n g i n e e r i n g was s u b m i t t e d t o us DecefTjl^r 2 8 , 1 9 9 2 . These t e s t s 
were u n d e r t a k e n t o d e t e r m i n e : A) The g u j t a b i l i t y of t h e l o t s i n 
g e n e r a l f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a s i n g l e f a m i l y r e s i d e n c e B) To 
c e r t i f y t h a t a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t can be i * i u e d jjnd t h u s t h e l o t can 
be s o l d C) To d e t e r m i n e i f more e x t e n s i v e t e s t i n g o f a l l t h e l o t s 
w o u l d be w a r r e n t e d D) To d e t e r m i n e haw l a r g e o f a w a s t e 
t r e a t m e n t f a c i l i t y w o u l d need t o be c o n s t r u c t e d t o make t h e 
u n b u i l d a b l e l o t s b u i l d a b l e E) B a s e d on i £ s s i z e how e x p e n s i v 
the waste t r e a t m e n t f a c i l i t y and d i s t r i b u t i o n system would be. 
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At t h e t i m e we e n t e r e d i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l a g r e e m e n t t o p u r c h a s e i t 
was o n l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 l o t s o f t h e 96 
h o m e s i t e s were n o t a b l e t o be c e r t i f i e d f o r an o n s i t e w a s t e 
d i s p o s a l s y s t e m . T h i s was b a s e d on t a l k i n g t o some o f t h e h o ~ 
o w n e r s l i v i n g a t Canyon Meadows and t a l k i n g t o M r . P h i l W r i g h t 
t h e W a s a t c h C o u n t y H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t D i r e c t o r . I t was M r . Dee 
O l s e n ' s ( t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e H o m e o w n e r s A s s o c i a t i o n ) 
b e l i e f t h a t o n l y a f e w o f t h e l o t s p u r c h a s e d had n o t p a s s e d 
f o r p e r c o l a t i o n . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e C o u n t y H e a l t h 
D e p a r t m e n t d o e s n o t k e e p r e c o r d s o f l o t s w h i c h a r e t e s t e d 
a n d d o ' n o t p a s s f o r p e r c o l a t i o n , o n l y t h e o n e s w h i c h h a v e a 
p e r m i t i s s u e d t o i n s t a l l t h e w a s t e d i s p o s a l s y s t e m . 
From t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e RG&B r e p o r t we now h a v e d e t e r m i n e d t h a * 
t h e p r o b l e m i s much m o r e e x t e n s i v e t h a n we o r i g i n a l l y t h o u g h t . I t 
s h o w s o n l y 3 l o t s o f - t h e 17 t e s t e d a r e c e r t i f i a b l e a n d c a n be 
s o l d . P o s s i b l y t h r e e m o r e m i g h t p a s s s u b j e c t t o f u r t h e r 
t e s t i n g . A s s u m i n g 6 o f t h e 1 7 l o t s t e s t e d c o u l d be b u i l t on 
i t now a p p e a r s t h a t o v e r 6 0 % , n o t 5 *< , o f t h e l o t s a r e 
u n b u i l d a b l e w i t h o u t an o n s i t e w a s t e t r e a t m e n t p l a n t b e i n g b u i l t . 
T h e a t t a c h e d p r o p o s a l f r o m T r a n s e n v i r o , I n c . i n d i c a t e s t h a t a 
p l a n t t o h a n d e l t h i s l a r g e n u m b e r o f l o t s w o u l d c o s t 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 3 7 0 , 0 0 0 . I n h i s a s s e s m e n t Of a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s 
o f s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t f o r t h e u n b u i l d a b l e l o t s M r . R o b e r t G u n n e l o f 
RB8G e s t i m a t e s t h e t o t a l c o s t i n c l u d i n g s e w e r l i n e s a n d 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m " w o u l d be i n t h e r a n g e o f $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 t o 
$ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 " . I t w a s o u r o r i g i n a l p l a n t o f o l l o w t h e a p p r a i s e r s 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t o c o n s o l o d a t e t h e f e w u n b u i l d a b l e l o t s w i t h 
b u i l d a b l e l o t s a n d n o t b u i l d a p l a n t a t a l l . We l a t e r t h o u g h t 
a b o u t i n s t a l l i n g a m u c h s m a l l e r m u c h l e s r e x p e n s i v e p l a n t 
f o r t h e f e w p r e v i o u s l y p u r c h a s e d l o t s a n d o u r l o t s t h a t d i d 
n o t p e r c o l a t e . T h e p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e we w e r e w o r k i n g w i t h 
when we e n t e r e d t h e p u r c h a s e d a g r e e m e n t was $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 f o r a c o m p l e t e 
s y s t e m . The C o u n t y H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t h a s s e r i o u s c o n c e r n s on how 
a s y s t e m o f t h i s t y p e w i l l be m a i n t a i n e d a n d how e f f l u e n t s w i l l be 
h a n d e l e d o n s i t e s i n c e t h e y a r e n o t a l l o w e d t o be d i s c h a r g e d i n t o 
t h e P r o v o R i v e r o r i t s t r i b u t a r i e s . T h e r e i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n t y 
w e a t h e r t h e y w i l l a p p r o v e an o n s i t e s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t f a c i l i t y 
e v e n i f we a r e w i l l i n g t o p a y f o r i t . 
W h i l e d o i n g our r e s e a r c h on t h e p e r c o l a t o n i s s u e we d i s c o v e r e d 
a n o t h e r s e r i o u s p r o b l e m . T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l u n d e r g r o u n d s u l f u r 
s p r i n g s t h a t s u r f a c e i n t h e m e a d o w a r e a . D u r i n g t h e s u m m e r t h e 
s t i n c h o f s u l f e r g e t s v e r y s t r o n g and w i l l be r e p u l s i v e t o p o t e n t .. 
l o t b u y e r s . We h a v e a l s o r e s e a r c h e d t h i s p r o b l e m and b e l i e v e f ^ •?-
e x p e n d i t u r e o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 t h i s p r o b l e m c a n b e c o n t r o t l e c 
T h i s i s a n o t h e r e x p e n d i t u r e t h a t we w e r e n o t e x p e c t i n g b u t now 
n e e d s t o m a d e . We do n o t b e l i e v e t h e F . D . I . C . a p p r a i s a l t o o k t h i s 
p r o b l e m i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n b u t i t s h o u l d be s i n c e , i t d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t s t h e p r o p e r t y v a l u e . You may c a l l o u r g e o l o g i c a l c o n s u l t a n t , 
J o h n M a a s , a t 8 0 1 - 2 2 5 - 2 0 5 0 i f y o u w o u l d l i k e m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g t h i s m a t t e r . 
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D u r i n g t h i s due d i l i g e n c e p e r i o d we a I $ o l e a r n e d t h a t W a s a t c h 
Coun ty i s no l o n g e r f a v o r a b l e t o w a r d s s i g n i f i c a n t l y e x p a n d i n g t h e 
number o f home s i t e s beyond t h e p r e s e n t number . The o r i g i n a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t was c o n c e i v e d t o e v e n t u a l l y have a p p r o x i m a t e l y 160 l o t s 
i n 5 p l a t s . 96 home s i t e s i n c o m p a s s i n g 74 s i n g l e f a m i l y l o t s and 
2 2 i m p r o v e d c o n d o m i n u m p a d s i n t w o p l a t s w e r e d e v e l o p e d . Bob 
M a t h i s , t h e Coun ty P l a n n e r , f e e l s t h e s i t e i s o n l y s u i t a b l e f o r 
l i m i t e d e x p a n s i o n b e y o n d t h e p r e s e n t number o f home s i t e s . He w o u l d 
l i k e t o see t h e d e n s i t y r e d u c e d by a I I p w i n g some l o w d e n s i t y 
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t o t h e u n d e v e l o p e d a r e a s b u t w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t 
f o r each new p a r c e l c r e a t e d we w i l l be c o n s o l o d a t i n g t w o e x i s t i n g 
1 / 2 a c r e l o t s i n p l a t A o r B i n t o one 1 a c r e p a r c e l . He s i t e s 
e c o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s , p r o b l e n r s w i t h g e o l o g y , l a c k o f w a t e r . r i g h t s * 
T to g u a r a n t e e w a t e r s u p p l y , w a s t e d i s p o s a l , s i t e a c c e s s 
p r o b l e m s and p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e m a i n t a n e n c e o f t h e e x i s t i n g 
w a t e r sys tem as r e a s o n s f o r l i m i t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t e x p a n s i o n . 
T h i s f a c t r e d u c e s t h e v a l u e o f t h p r o p e r t y and s h o u l d h a v e b e e n 
c o n s i d e r e d when p r e p a r i n g t h e a p p r a i s a l . 
We a l s o l e a r n e d d u r i n g ou r due d i l i g e n c e s t u d i e s t hi a t t h e r e i s 
no p o t e n t i a l f o r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e mecjdow a r e a . We w e r e 
p l a n n i n g f o r a g o l f c o u r s e w h i c h w o u l d be an a t t r a c t i v e a m e n i t y 
f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and f e a s b l e s i n c e t h e l a n d i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
f r e e . T h i s p r o p o s a l was a l s o t u r n e d d o w n by M r . M a t h i s as 
" l e a k a g e o f n u t r i a n t s ( f e r t i l i z e r s ) i n t o t h e w a t e r t a b l e w o u l d 
c o n t a m i n a t e w a t e r t r i b u t a r i e s t o t h e P r o v o R i v e r . " He a l s o 
s t a t e s t h a t " s t o r m d r a i n a g e has n e v e r w o r k e d p r o p e r l y and common 
f a c i l i t i e s n e e d t o be r e v i e w e d and p o s s i b l y u p d a t e d " , a n o t h e r 
p r o b l e m we were n o t aware o f . 
T h i s r e p o r t o f ou r due d i l i g e n c e s t u d i e s c l e a r l y shows t h e r e has 
b e e n a l o t o f new i n f o r m a t i o n d i s c o v e r e d t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
e f f e c t s t h e v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . T h e C a n y o n M e a d o w s 
D e v e l o p m e n t has many more e n v i r o m e n t a l and g e o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s 
t h a n t h e a p p r a i s e r , t h e F . D . I . C . o r o u r s e l v e s r e a l i z e d a t t h e t i m e 
t h e o r i g i n a l a p p r a i s a l and p u r c h a s e a g r e e m e n t w e r e m a d e . T h e s e 
p r o b l e m s w i l l r e q u i r e an e x p e n d i t u r e o f h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s 
o f d o l l a r s i n i m p r o v e m e n t s t o c o r r e c t . T h e r e i s no g u a r a n t e e 
t h a t t h e S t a t e and W a s a t c h Coun ty w i l l a l l o w us t o b u i l d a sewage 
t r e a t m e n t p l a n t needed t o make t h i s i n v e s t m e n t v i a b l e , t h u s 
e x p o s i n g us t o much r i s k . The e x p e c t a t i o n o f f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t 
e x p a n s i o n b e y o n d t h e n u m b e r o f l o t s o f t h e p r e s e n t p r o j e c t i s 
a l s o u n c e r t a i n . 
I n l i g h t o f t h i s new i n f o r m a t i o n we w o u l d s u g g e s t t h e F . D . I . C . 
c o m p l e t e t h e p e r c o l a t i o n t e s t i n g o f t h e r ^ m a T h i n g u n t e s t e d l o t s 
t o a s c e r t a i n t h e a c c u r a t e n u m b e r o f b u i l ^ b l e l o t s t h a t c a n be 
r e s o l d , t h e n have t h e p r o p e r t y r e a p p r a i s e d by t h e f i r m t h a t 
d i d t h e o r i g n i a l a p p r a i s a l . By f a c t o r i n g i n t h i s new d a t a and o u r 
a n a l y i s we a r e c o n f i d e n t t h e p r i c e now o f f e r e d w i l l be show^ 
t o be c l o s e t o t h e a p p r a i s e d v a l u e and w i t h i n y o u r s a l e s 
p r i c i n g g u i d e l i n e s . 
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prepared to m o v e f o r w a r d with c o m p l e t i n g the pu r c h a s e . 
•est t h i s m a t t e r be c o n c l u d e d w i t h y o u and y o u r o f f i c e . 
n,,7 uwwision to transfer the file to the Denver o f f i c e , which is 
u n f a m i l i a r with the p r o p e r t y , will only c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s and 
p r o b a b l y delay c o m p l e t i n g the sale. R e g a r d l e s s of the o u t c o m e of 
t h i s m a t t e r w e - w i s h to t h a n k you, M r . M a s u c c i , for the e x c e l l e n t 
c o o p e r a t i o n you have e x t e n d e d to us during this t r a n s a c t i o n . 
S i n c e r e l y , 
\_x-l7:?l'V,''.^. 
Jay Jiohnson 
John Ma I hi 
Mah l i Deve lopment , I n c . 
w i t h e n c l o s u r e s 
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State Savings & Loan, 7516 AV=$490,000 (09/92) 





Re: Sale to Jay Johnson/Mahli Development 
On December 22, 1992, Authorization was granted to sell the asset 
to Jay Johnson and/or Mahli Development (Case #l-9195--92-CRC, 
attached). This case "extended11 the earlier $500,000 sale to the 
Buyers. 
The Buyers have balked at executing our Purchase and Sale (P&S) 
Agreement. They had agreed to let the deposit money become non-
refundable in exchange for a 9 0-day escrow period. Their due 
diligence had purportidly been performed during the prior escrow 
period. 
Historically, FDIC lost two sale escrows in 1990f for $1,001,500 
and $876,500, mainly due to percolation problems associated with 
the site. The referenced buyers original offer of $900,000 was 
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Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
Brian K. Haws, Bar No. 8198 
Jared R. Frei, Bar No. 8833 
DUVAL HAWS & FREI, P.C 
947 South 500 East, Suite 230 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 763-0155 
Facsimile: (801) 763-8379 
Attorneys for Appellants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEW CANYON MEADOWS L.C., a I 
Utah limited liability company, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Appellate Court Docket No. 
vs. 
20020816-CA 
CANYON MEADOWS MUTUAL 
WATER COMPANY, a Utah corporation, Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellant. 
I certify that I caused to be mailed on April 18, 2003, the BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLEE by first-class U.S. Mail to: Blake T. Ostler, WINGO, RINEHART & 
McCONKIE, 150 North Main St., #202, Bountiful, UT 84010, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/ Appellee. 
DUVAL HAWS &FREI, P.C. 
/^^Q8$£>0'H DUVAL 
<-^~"BRIAN K. HAWS 
JARED R. FREI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
l«an Court of Ar^v
 :, 
APR 2 5 
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